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Sosa’s response to the swamping problem improves upon traditional 
responses, even upon those within virtue epistemology itself, in at least two 
ways. It proposes a (still) novel view of epistemic normativity in the form of 
action/performance normativity. In addition, through this view, it conceives 
of beliefs as forms of attempting, consciously or not, to get it right about 
some particular fact or state of affairs. This way of viewing beliefs avoids 
the traditional reliabilist notion of a belief as a product of a well-functioning 
cognitive process, which seems to be easily affected by the challenges raised by 
critics of several externalist theories of justification. 
The particular type of telic virtue epistemology that Sosa (2021) 
succinctly presents is the result of a multi-decade long effort he underwent 
to build an elegant epistemology that perhaps could be fit to face both more 
traditional justification-related tasks, like responding to Gettier-like cases, 
and more specific problems, such as the problem of explaining the value of 
the output of a well-oiled belief formation process over the equally accurate 
outputs stemming from luck (either good or bad luck). By uniting both the 
idea that our belief-forming processes are attempts to fulfil a particular telos 
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(getting to the truth) and the idea that to do that in the best way possible we 
should embark in a second order reflexive endeavor, Sosa (2010) points to 
the path that could lead us to, what he calls elsewhere, “knowledge full well”.
The way we walk this path, he argues in this paper, must be the main 
object of epistemic evaluation. If beliefs are nothing more than attempts to get 
it right, we should, according to this view, evaluate the quality of such attempt, 
which, in turn, will reveal the quality of the resulting state (whatever this may 
be called). Thus, the main task of epistemic normativity is to assess the quality 
of a particular type of action or performance, the action of forming a belief 
that aims to truth and, hopefully, gets to it competently and consequently – it 
gets to the truth as a consequence of the competent performance. According 
to Sosa, this picture is enough to direct us away from the swamping problem 
and its question of the value of knowledge. 
Sosa’s account in this paper, however, leaves us with a few knots to 
untie in terms of a complete understanding of the dynamic nature of belief-
forming mechanisms. One can be completely sympathetic to the praxis turn 
in epistemology that Sosa promotes, via the view that agency is central to 
epistemic evaluation, and still be puzzled by how to exactly cash out some of 
the details.
If the currency that epistemic agency trades in is representation as 
an attempt or endeavor towards truth, either in the form of affirmations or 
judgements, how should we explain the nature of long-lasting cognitive states 
such as unrevised beliefs one holds for a long time? How should we see beliefs 
that are seared in our intellect, long after their acquisition, as something more 
than mere mental states without the dynamic nature of the relation an agent 
has to propositions that are current to her mind, and to which truth she 
attempts to get, accurately, adroitly and aptly? 
It is one thing to argue that believing is endeavoring towards truth, and 
that epistemic normativity should focus only on the quality of such endeavor. 
It is another thing to cash out all our current and dispositional beliefs as 
exhibiting the same degree of transparency of the performance responsible for 
their formation. How can we evaluate long-held beliefs and other cognitive 
dispositions in terms of their performance towards truth when it seems that 
the only element we can grasp to assess is the final product of the epistemic 
praxis? 
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Take the case of a dispositional belief, such as my belief that there 
were four mango trees in my street when I was a kid. Suppose I do not 
currently entertain such belief. Is this belief one that can be evaluated in terms 
of the quality of the past performance towards truth? Or should this belief 
be entertained in order to be assessed? In this case, what are the conditions 
under which this belief should be evaluated? Should we count past perceptual 
mechanisms to assess the competence when counting the believing as adroit? 
Should we reserve this evaluation only to my memory and other inferential 
mechanisms that I currently make use of?
Maybe these are not so interesting questions when we are dealing with 
such a robust and neat proposal. But since Sosa’s theory want us to abandon 
the idea of beliefs as products in favor of the view of them as processes, as 
attempts to get it right, maybe we need a clearer account of the beliefs that 
don’t seem to fit perfectly to the performance model; beliefs we tend to see 
more as products of a cognitive process in the traditional reliabilist sense. If we 
want to move past the swamping problem, as we might think it could be done 
so via Sosa’s account, we might need to explain away any loose thread that 
could throw us back into its hold. Until then, though, let’s keep admiring the 
unique and elegant theorizing contained in Sosa’s writing and let’s get inspired 
by his notable performance in improving and advancing epistemology in its 
more interesting aspects. 
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